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Levinas’s contribution to the Law of Hospitality 
 
Abstract 
This article examines the ethical thinking of Levinas, from which Derrida’s Law of Hospitality 
is derived, to see if it is sustainable in the face of Badiou’s claim that transcendence cannot 
be admitted into the body of philosophical thought. Is Levinas, as Badiou argues, seeking to 
smuggle religion into philosophy and if so does this attempt amount to no more than an anti-
philosophy theology which has to be resisted for the integrity of philosophy? Dissenting from 
this view I return to Levinas and consider the problematisation with ethics which accompanies 
the arrival of the Third that, on the face of it supports Badiou’s claim he is engaged in a form 
of virtue signalling which is without relevance to the concerns of life.  I then go on and refute 
Zizek’s claim that Levinas’s Other shares an origin (conceptually) with the Nazi Other.  The 
article concludes by examining the contribution of transcendence.  I consider that it does have 
a place in philosophy and that it is dogmatic and unnecessary to suggest otherwise.  I suggest 
that transcendence allows us to look at the concept of the Good in a way that the thinking of 
materialists, such as Badiou never can. Levinas allows us to conceive of a conscience of the 
law that introduces justice and holds the law to account by challenging its claims to be acting 
justly.  This connects our thinking on the subject to Western tradition which materialism 
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Legal text and the necessity of engagement – the case of the refugees 
Douzinas and Warrington sought, through a Derridean-style deconstruction of two cases 1 to 
demonstrate how the House of Lords adopted a counter-narrative to override the Tamils’ plea 
for asylum under Article 1 of the UN Convention on the Status of Refugees 1951 which 
obligated signatories to the Convention to offer asylum to any person who “owing to a well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion etc.... is outside the country of 
his nationality and is unable , or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the 
protection of that country.”  The House of Lords held that even “a genuine fear of persecution 
could not suffice (as) the fears must have an ‘objective basis’ which could be ‘objectively 
determined’”. 2  Fear, in other words is a subjective emotion that can be objectively 
discounted because the courts were in possession of knowledge that revealed that fear to be 
baseless.  In a second case the House of Lords determined that Tamil asylum seekers were 
illegal entrants into the UK who must be denied the right of appeal as otherwise it would 
discriminate against those who, as legal entrants, could only appeal after first leaving the UK.  
The question D&W posed was “are the judgments just?” 3  Even if it were possible to arrive 
at a satisfactory and universally accepted definition of justice it would still be easier to identify 
and proclaim an act of injustice than to assert with unshakeable confidence that the law had 
acted justly.  The role for postmodernists, above all, is to disturb and disrupt the legal 
narrative by challenging the law’s belief in itself as an instrument of justice, framed in 
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autopoietical terms, and its narrative that the greatest safeguard against a miscarriage of 
justice is the law itself.  The arrogance and hubris that manifested in such certainty explains 
the law’s reluctance to acknowledge and correct its errors. 
 
A more recent examination of the same issue concerned a Dutch case where an asylum seeker 
was treated in a not dissimilar manner.  According to Stronks 4, clearly following Douzinas and 
Warrington, the case exposes the presence of “inclusionary and exclusionary forces…at the 
very threshold of hospitality”.  For Stronks, borrowing from Derrida, the impulse to generosity 
is to be discovered in the spirit of unconditional welcome which as the Law of Hospitality is 
both above (and constrained by) the laws of hospitality manifested in ‘the condition of custom 
and legal boundaries’ and which are in an antinomic relation as they simultaneously work to 
reinforce and resist each other.  Thus “the laws are always, however, in contradiction with 
the Law; they threaten, undermine and deprave it.  At the same time, the conditional laws 
would no longer be laws of hospitality if they were not guided, inspired and annexed by the 
Law of unconditional hospitality”. 5 The antinomy, as identified by Derrida and applied by 
Stronks to this case, 6 is the conflict between the desire to do right by the Other as the stranger 
to whom I am drawn in the spirit of friendship and my innate resentment towards her 
encroaching presence, that place obligations upon me and steals my freedom, now that I am 
in a moral thrall to her.  I am duty bound to come to her aid as a matter of compassion and in 
recognition of her vulnerability and yet I harbour scepticism within me towards her apparent 
frailty.  What if she is abusing my hospitality and taking advantage of my generosity?  A 
                                                          
4 Stronks (2012).  
5 Supra. n. 4 at 3. 





creeping awareness that she might be deceiving me fuels my suspicion of her motives. She 
must be tested in order that I will not be duped.   
 
Stronks notes that the Dutch government’s asylum procedure was to deconstruct the 
refugee’s story even to the extent of substituting his date of birth with a more ‘plausible’ one 
and overriding ‘his-story’ with ‘our-story’ which, as national inquisitor, acting in the interests 
of its people under the laws of hospitality, it was required to do upon establishing the ‘facts’.  
If the refugee could be proved to have offered a false narrative about how he had reached 
the Netherlands then it was just as likely that his claim to be in fear of persecution was 
similarly suspect.   It followed that the objective and dispassionate approach of the 
government must produce a version of events approximating to the ‘truth’ more closely than 
the one presented by the refugee.  The case was successfully appealed to the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECHR) which held that that the intended expulsion of the refugee was in 
breach of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 7 The contrasting 
approaches at the national level (UK judicial and Dutch ministerial) and at the supranational 
(ECHR) accounts for the different outcomes: the former being more directly accountable to 
popular sensitivities on the subject and the latter, perceived to be more detached and 
remote, adhering to the core values of the European Community with its insistence on 
overarching principles that resist the violence of the law.  According to Stronks Article 3 is a 
bulwark against a sovereign state’s attempts to apply an unfettered right to exclude aliens 
                                                          






and serves as a prohibition which “according to the Court, enshrines one of the more 
fundamental values of democratic societies and is furthermore absolute.” 8 
 
Levinas’s contribution to the Law of hospitality 
The forms of hospitality discussed by Derrida derive in essence from ethics developed from 
the ethical thinking of Emanuel Levinas as conceived through his account of the Self’s 
relationship with the Other.  Almost all readers of Levinas acknowledge that his philosophy is 
problematised from the outset and hence it is invariably accompanied by an attempt to return 
it to an ontological setting which Levinas is always trying to break free from in an attempt to 
formulate a transcendental ethics in order to develop a conception of an unassailable 
morality.  Levinas does not discount the possibility that we live in a amoral universe 9 which 
we seek to master through the imposition of order but for him the discovery of the Good 
through meaning is ultimately meaningless; the equation needs to be reversed so that we 
arrive at meaning through first establishing the Good.  Only then is it possible to fix an 
absolute moral reference point that is not diminished or tainted by the inevitable 
compromises that existence requires the Self to make.  The Self’s encounter with the Other is 
the defining, if not to say decisive, event because in Levinasian ethics it is her face that 
establishes the conditions for an ethical relationship from which it is possible to derive a moral 
foundation and purpose for existence.  It gives rise to the possibility of the Self being selfless, 
being obsessed with the Other to the exclusion of all thought of self. It recognises and 
venerates the Other’s difference as ethically unassimilable and utterly ineradicable.  
                                                          
8 Supra. n. 4. at 18. 
9  In the very first sentence of Totality and Infinity Levinas states that “everyone will readily agree that it is of 





According to Levinas whatever assumptions I have of the Other, one thing that I can never   
Furthermore, I deceive myself in the attempt while ethically violating the Other by seeking to 
extinguish her otherness. 
 
Badiou’s critique of ethical thinking 
One of the problems identified by Critchley is that Levinas offers no dimension of sublimation 
as  “there is an excessive masochism in (his) discourse, where I am not only responsible for 
my own persecution but also for my own persecutor”. 10  This accounts for one of Badiou’s 
criticism of Levinas and all forms of ethical thinking and why he seeks to sweep away all 
“theoretical associations of ethics with a goodness too good for the world”. 11 Badiou’s 
principal objection to Levinas’s ethical thinking is that he sees it as an attempt to smuggle 
religion into philosophy; itself an admission that traditional religious thought can no longer 
be sustained.  Levinas is simply clothing religious sentiments within the idiom of philosophy 
12 and although Badiou refers to Levinas as a “coherent and inventive thinker” nothing can 
obscure the truth that “taken in general, ethics is a pious discourse”. For Badiou, piety is mere 
sentiment; he observes that not only does Levinas not present us with a philosophy, his 
“ethical dominance of the Other over the theoretical ontology of the same is entirely bound 
up with a religious axiom … in truth, Levinas has no philosophy – not even philosophy as the 
‘servant’ of theology” of and consequently we are left with “a pious discourse without piety 
and a cultural sociology preached in line with new-style sermons, in lieu of the late class 
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struggle”.13  According to Hutchens, Badiou’s objection to ethical thinking, manifested in the 
vehemence with which it is expressed, stems from his view that far from amounting to 
philosophical reasoning it is more properly to be regarded as an anti-philosophy theology 
which for all its hyperbolic rhetoric is “merely mumbling over the corpse of divinity, a forlorn 
theology obsessed with a god that has absconded with the truth.” 14  Badiou’s 
uncompromising opposition to Levinas’s ethical thinking is based on his understanding that 
anything that is not a “militant resolution to persist with the truth as best one can” 15  does 
not belong to the discipline of philosophy and is to be resisted strenuously as the enemy of 
philosophy working to undermine it through a playful but ultimately vacuous sophistry all the 
more dangerous because of its seductive allure.   
Badiou considers nothing less than the integrity of philosophy as a discipline is at stake. The 
quest for Truth, a solemn duty falling to philosophy, cannot be discarded by introducing 
unfounded propositions that belong to the realm of speculation and superstition.  Badiou’s 
insistence on defending the ‘honour of philosophy’ is an attempt to preserve the integrity, as 
he sees it, of the discipline by thrusting to the outside of philosophical debate any discussion 
that does not rigorously adhere to its obligation to uncover meaning.  Whereas formerly 
religion had its place within that debate, scientific knowledge feeding into philosophy (post 
Darwin’s discoveries and Nietzsche’s insights) now precludes it from inclusion because every 
factual discovery leads us away from any need to rely on a concept of the divine. Ethical 
thinking is populated by “opinions without an ounce of truth” 16  There is clearly much to 
applaud in Badiou’s rigorous adherence to the pursuit of truth, his willingness to acknowledge 
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14  Hutchens  2004.  
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his abandonment of positions no longer tenable 17 and his injunction to ‘continuez’ (‘keep 
going!’).  Less admirable is his insistence that any thinking, specifically ethical thinking, that is 
not truth led adds no value to philosophical debate and, worse than that, is dangerously 
subversive of philosophy as a whole; hence his designation of it as anti-philosophy.  Indeed 
Badiou’s stance is reminiscent of the position within jurisprudence taken by the Scandinavian 
realists, towards the opposite end of the political spectrum, who were vehemently opposed 
to human rights because, as Alf Ross has argued, the very notion is derived from natural rights 
and owes more to the sensibilities of the individual rather than empiricism where “evidence 
as a criterion of truth explains the utterly arbitrary character of the metaphysical 
assertions”.18   Ross was dismissive of the demand for justice because he considered it to 
harbour a fundamental dishonesty in its attempt to mask the reality at its core; that the 
demand is not driven by self-interest in conflict with opposing interests “but that it possesses 
a higher absolute validity…(precluding) all rational argument and discussion of settlement.” 
19Ross’s repudiation of the metaphysical within the law, a theme common among the 
proponents of Scandinavian realism 20,  is couched in such emotive and pejorative terms that 
Escorihuela has referred to it as the ‘rhetorical rage of science’ characterised as it is by 
‘theoretical deprecation’ and “offensive accusations both aimed at the conceptual edifice of 
current legal systems, and thrown at the face of canonical scholarly references in the field.”21  
While it would be grossly inappropriate to accuse Badiou of plumbing such depths there is a 
                                                          
17  Supra. n. 11 at 95- 97.  Badiou discusses how previously “I defended the idea that an emancipatory politics 
presumed some kind of political party”.  He accepts that while the Marxist classification of political classes 
remains a valuable tool the status of class has now changed so that while there is no need to revise Marxist 
analysis but more “a matter of going beyond the idea that politics represent objective groups that can be 
classified as classes.” 
18 Ross (1959) p. 261. 
19 Supra. n.18. at 263. 
20  Spaak (2014) 





harshness to his rhetoric and an exasperation with ethical thinking that harbours certain 
similarities, not least of which is the insistence that a subject such as philosophy, just as 
jurisprudence has to be for Ross, must be pure and true to itself.   
Badiou’s rejection of transcendence within philosophy  
In his demand for philosophical integrity Badiou rejects any synthesis of theology and 
philosophy and this prompts the question, how do we recognise ‘Evil’ and does the very 
notion even exist?  If morality is not derived from a transcendental source, by what means 
may we discern that we are in its presence?  According to Badiou “the only genuine ethics is 
of truths in the plural” or rather “ethics does not exist.  There is only the ethic-of (of politics, 
of love, of science of art” for there are “as many subjects as there are truths.” 22  Badiou’s 
conclusion is that the “ethic of truths aims neither to submit the world to the abstract rule of 
a Law, nor to struggle against an external and radical Evil. On the contrary, it strives through 
its own fidelity to truths, to ward off Evil – that Evil which it recognises as the underside, or 
dark side, of these very truths.” 23  While Badiou despises particularism in general he accepts 
that it may be put to service of the Good in the particular.  For “while every invocation of 
blood and soil, of race, of custom, of community, works directly against truths” 24 when 
advancing the “progressive formulation of a cause which engages cultural or communal 
predicates linked to incontestable situations of oppression…these particularities, these 
singularities, these communal qualities (may be) situated in another space and become 
heterogeneous to their ordinary oppressive operations.” 25  Badiou provides the example of 
Cuba which despite its “outmoded conception of politics” is to be respected as one of “the 
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forms of resistance to the hegemony of the global market, and to its principal organizer: 
American imperialism”. 26 However, “incontestable situations of oppression” are not as 
frequently obvious as Badiou’s formulation might suggest as the process of decolonisation 
serves to illustrate and, more importantly, can mask different forms of oppression.  Not all 
anti-colonialist movements will inevitably be morally superior to their ‘oppressoers’ to which 
numerous crimes and atrocities can attest.  The presentation of imperialism as an intrinsically 
criminal venture against humanity does not of itself invariably provide moral validation for all 
forces seeking to oppose it.  And one should be cautious of accepting that claims that the 
crimes of one side can be mitigated or excused if they are committed in the service of some 
overarching and redemptive goal.   Bowring cites Badiou’s acclamation of the Revolutions of 
1792 and 1917 as ‘true universal events’ that permit the 20th century to be viewed as one not 
of ‘promises’ but of ‘accomplishments’ in that the victories won in the struggles against 
colonialism in Algeria and Vietnam vindicate previous unsuccessful uprisings and 
“compensate for the massacres of June 1848 or the Paris Commune”. 27  This exoneration of 
sacrifice and martyrdom attempts to place value on the countless individuals who have died 
in a cause as the price of progress but from a Levinasian perspective the life of a single 
individual is thematically irreducible.  
The materialist viewpoint is that ‘martyrdom’ is not a celebration of violence per se, as was 
the case of the Nazi glorification of the 1923 Munich Beer Hall Putsch, but that it is a 
veneration of the victims of reactionary violence; that progress cannot be put on indefinite 
hold by an abhorrence of countering violent oppression with violence.  However, the 
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readiness to resort to violence in defence of a progressive cause exposes that cause to an 
almost inevitable contamination from Badiou’s ‘underside’ so that violent means are all too 
likely to become the only considered means of securing the desired end.  The paradox, and 
the irony, is that in decrying the hypocrisy of ethical ideology’s thinking of the Other Badiou 
does not offer an alternative vision of the Other that respects difference.  If difference is, as 
he suggests, “all there is” then the goal of progress is to find common cause in a sameness 
which leads even more strongly to an eradication of difference for not only must the Other 
become like me, she must learn to think like me as well.28  The assumption of difference as 
the starting point has a beguiling allure but the search for sameness risks difference’s 
annihilation as intolerance for all forms of falsehood (religious, political and ideological) takes 
hold.    The desire to proselytise, to recruit to one’s own version of the truth, is embedded in 
modernism in the form of the competing attempts to spread liberal democratic ideals or to 
resist Western imperialism through revolutionary struggle bear witness.  Can Badiou even 
assert that there is an ethic-of philosophy as a means of working towards truth for surely what 
we discern time and time again is that what has the appearance of truth is but an illusion?   
Badiou is astute enough to realise this when he refers to verisimilitude as that which passes 
for truth as discerned by logic and rational enquiry.  However, the possibility arises that not 
only may we duped by morality but also by the limits of our capacity to reason and what is 
claimed to be true may be no more than a manifestation of our desire for what we wish to be 
true. 
                                                          
28 Supra. n. 12 p 24, 25 Badiou states that “it might well be that ethical ideology, detached from the religious 
teachings which at least conferred upon it the fullness of  revealed identity, is simply the final imperative of a 
conquering civilization: ‘Become like me and I will respect your difference.’” It is not clear why Badiou ascribes 
this sentiment to ethical ideology when it is symptomatic of all political ideologies, progressive and 





How Levinas accounts for the disruption of the dyadic relationship 
For Levinas the origin of ethics is to be found in the Self’s encounter with the Other which can 
only occur in a dyadic relationship that is undisturbed by the presence of another party.  It is 
clear, however, that ontologically the Self can never be free to be alone with the Other. On 
the face of it this supports Badiou’s dismissal of Levinas’s thinking as a pious discourse that 
amounts to little more than an intellectual exercise in virtue signalling.  A problem 
commences with the arrival of the Third and from that point onwards, for many critics, 
Levinasian ethics is beset by an aporia that it cannot hope to resolve.  The purely ethical 
encounter with the Other can never take place as the Self is surrounded by a multiplicity of 
Others and how is it possible to accept Levinas’s quotation from Dostoyevsky in Brothers 
Karamazov that “each of us is guilty before everyone, and I more than the others”? 29  The 
Third brings the problematisation of alterity for she forces choice upon me.  What if the Third 
is in competition with the Other?  There are two parties now to contend with both as Other 
and Third.  If the Self treats both equally she fails to make good on her boundless obligation 
to either, yet to favour one Other at the other Other’s expense means she will be guilty of an 
ethical betrayal of at least one the parties.  To address the dilemma Levinas introduces us to 
his conception of the Neighbour. 
According to Levinas, “in the responsibility for the Other, for another freedom, the negativity 
of this anarchy, this refusal of the present, of appearing, of the immemorial, commands me 
and ordains me to the other, to the first on the scene, and makes me approach him, makes 
me his neighbor … It provokes this responsibility against my will, that is by substituting me for 
                                                          





the other as hostage.” 30  The Neighbour is the Other who has a claim on the Self’s moral 
responsibility as ‘the first on the scene’ as the Other par excellence as now the Self has choice 
forced upon her and because I am compelled to protect and defend her in an ethical sense it 
is a choice of no choice.  The Self gains the freedom to be a moral (ethical) being at the 
expense of her personal freedom.  Could it be that Levinas is opening the door to the worst 
form of particularism such as his criticised exoneration of Zionism?  Isn’t the Neighbour, under 
the guise of all humanity, merely shorthand for the Jew?    This is clearly the view of Žižek who 
reminds us of the “traumatic character” of Levinas’s Neighbour, as the favoured Other, that 
conjures up a very different conception of the Other; not the Other whose vulnerability stirs 
my compassion and invites the Self’s protection but rather as the implacable enemy with 
whom no relationship is possible as the one who will not be appeased or mollified by anything 
short of the Self’s destruction.  “Horrible as it may sound, the Levinasian Other as the abyss 
of otherness from which the ethical injunction emanates and the Nazi figure of the Jew as the 
less-than-human Other-enemy originates from the same source.” 31    While the attempt to 
conflate Zionism with Nazism may grate, more importantly I think, it is mistaken for not only 
does it not bear comparison in terms of scale and degree its outlook on the Other is directed 
to a very different end. 
A place for particularism 
It is true that Levinas has addressed the problem in a way that created difficulties for readers 
of his works as it appears to run counter to the exorbitant generosity of his ethics.  The 
passage that has attracted the sharpest criticism is his answer to the question: “isn’t the 
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‘other’ above all the Palestinian?” There is no doubt that his response is evasive; not only 
does he not refer to the Palestinians by name but directs his attention to the Israeli as 
Neighbour for “if your neighbour attacks another neighbour or treats him unjustly, (this 
author’s emphasis) what can you do? Then alterity takes on another character; in alterity we 
can find an enemy, or at least then we are faced with the problem of knowing who is right 
and who is wrong.  There are people who are wrong.” 32  What appears to be a rallying cry to 
defend Israel (following widespread international condemnation for its failure to protect the 
Palestinian refugees from the massacres by Falange militia at the Sabra and Chatila camps in 
Lebanon) actually contains a far more nuanced message.   For implicit in Levinas’s statement 
is the acknowledgment that the unnamed Palestinian can be the Neighbour for what else can 
he mean when he refers to the situation “where your neighbour attacks another neighbour”?  
It is a conflict between two neighbours where the immediate threat of violence from one 
Neighbour is to be condemned as is the injustice of the other Neighbour.  The affinity of kith, 
kin and culture that draws Levinas to Israel as a refuge for Jews is conditional upon their just 
treatment of all the inhabitants that live within its borders and beyond for, in their failure to 
fulfil their messianic destiny, they will suffer the consequences.  “In this light, Levinas’s last 
words are a warning that the State of Israel is only justified if it obeys the prophetic call to 
justice.” 33 While critics may justly accuse of Levinas of failing to rise to the challenge to take 
an unequivocally moral stance, on the atrocities committed in the refugee camps, a close 
analysis of his reply  reveals that Levinas is refusing to permit the defence of a lack of 
culpability on Israel’s behalf as he insists that it is the duty of the Jew of the Diaspora to hold 
the Israeli, her Neighbour, to account and to shoulder “a responsibility that concerns and 
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engages even innocence” 34  Moral responsibility is not given a free pass even if guilt be 
absent. 
Even when Levinas is engaged in some ethical backpedalling where Israel is concerned he 
never, as Žižek would appear to suggest, presents the Palestinian as irredeemably alien or 
belonging to “the abyss of otherness” but rather takes the position that affinity or proximity 
force him to come down on the side of the Israeli. Because that support is borne of political 
necessity, rather than ethical exigency, it isn’t boundless but rather contingent upon the 
extent to which political actions can ultimately have a moral justification.  This is a stance that 
is far removed from the social Darwinism that fed Nazi ideology although it must be 
acknowledged that Israel’s moral case is seriously compromised by its constitution as an 
ethnocracy which calls its democratic credentials into question giving rise to the accusation 
that it is a racist state that ferociously protects its borders. 35 Israel’s reliance on force is only 
acceptable to Levinasn if it faces a genuine existential threat and even then only if it remains 
true to its messianic calling.  All states police their borders to a greater or lesser extent and 
while Badiou is ‘absolutely for’ the withering away of the state he acknowledges that “we still 
belong to a historical era dominated by states and borders” and that “there is nothing to 
suggest that the situation is going to change completely in the near future.  The real question 
is whether the regulations [réglementation] at issue are more or less consistent with 
egalitarian aspirations.” 36  For Badiou the question of immigration is an extension of the class 
struggle as the projection of the alien has shifted form first workers, then immigrants (and) 
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finally illegal aliens”. 37  Particularism is an instrument of oppression that is a continuation of 
class struggle as individuals searching for work are isolated from a category to which they can 
stake a legitimate claim and stripped of status if, for example, they lack residence papers, and 
(in France) count for less if indeed they are counted at all. 
While Badiou suggests that particularism is  a pernicious mindset he acknowledges that it can 
be harnessed to the benefit of certain events (ie the “the people’s struggle in Vietnam, or the 
national struggle in Vietnam” or the French anti-Nazi resistance) where the designation of 
“even ‘Arab’, even ‘Islam’, even ‘Jew’ even ‘French’ can, at a given moment, have a 
progressive political signification” 38  He sees philosophy as a conflict of ideas as “a struggle 
of universalism against universalism, not of particularism against universalism” 39 as a working 
towards Truth as a multiplicity of ‘truth-processes’ because what matters are the processes, 
in their integrity, rather than the Truth at which we may no more ever arrive than the end of 
a rainbow.   
The contribution of transcendence 
What Badiou is arguing for, above all else is that for thinking to be worthy of the name of 
philosophy, there must be both adherence and fidelity to it as a discipline that only admits 
propositions that meet the test of rigorous intellectual scrutiny and which discards or expels 
those which, by that measure, are untenable:  perhaps an overly restrictive view of what 
passes for philosophy for a proposition need not be truth-based as long as it is not passed off 
as the truth.  Levinas’s concept of a transcendental Good is derived from Jewish theology but 
is not accompanied by any need to believe in a divine authority.  It is unassailable and self-
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evident within its own terms as memorably and succinctly expressed by Bauman when he 
declares “I am ready to die for the Other is a moral statement; He should be ready to die for 
me is clearly not”.40  It is a proposition that we are free to refute, as indeed Badiou does, but 
it is one that helps to avoid the difficulties of an excessively materialist approach 41 that 
emphasises that human beings are animals, however plausible in scientific terms that may be.  
The paradox of Badiou’s approach to particularism is that far from amounting to its 
intellectual dismantlement it risks fortifying it instead by overriding an instinct for 
togetherness and social cohesion as a community that is intrinsic to all humans.  In contrast 
Levinas’s concept of the Neighbour not only acknowledges the inevitability of a choice, forced 
upon Self by being-in-the-World, but presents that choice in positive ethical terms.  However, 
while currently politics is resurrecting the dark underside of particularism the Levinasian 
Other is never irreducibly alien as Žižek infers or close to the product of Nazi loathing for the 
outsider together with the extreme racial narcissism that accompanied it 42.  Every individual 
is irreducibly Other and every Other is a Neighbour to whom the unbounded ethical obligation 
of the Self is owed.  But justice cannot be delivered equally to all for in the presence of two 
unique beings the genre appears and the terminology of Greek logic and politics prevail “but 
what I say, quite simply, is that it is, ultimately, based on the relationship to the other, on the 
ethics without which I would not have sought justice.” 43  It is this obsession for the well-being 
of the Other, in response to her vulnerability that responds to “a face in suffering (which) 
issues a command, a decree of specific performance: ‘Do not kill me’, ‘Welcome me’, ‘Give 
                                                          
40 Bauman (1993) p. 220. 
41 “I think that human beings are animals, animals which have at their disposal, a singular aleatory, and partial 
ability, which identifies them philosophically as human within the animal sphere” Supra n. 12 at 132. 
42 Derrida (1999) p. 147.    





me Sanctuary’, ‘Feed me’” that pricks the conscience of the law and disrupts the “neutral 
element of the universal.” 44 
Douzinas and Warrington have offered, in their response to Levinasian ethics, the 
“momentary principle of justice, inscribed at the heart of the judgment but always before the 
law (and) is what turns force into justice and force that does not heed its call to violence”. 45 
The judge as the critical figure “is always involved and implicated” and as such is called upon 
to respond to the ethical relationship, when he judges.” 46 But, however, appealing this may 
seem, Levinas himself would probably reject such a solution.  Alterity is unthematizable and 
cannot be grafted onto the law in any prescriptive sense and will always defer to Greek logic.  
The Judge is not free to be alone with the Other and cannot judge her as Neighbour without 
reference to the Third as she cannot act out of her own free will but merely as an agent or 
instrument of state to whom she is accountable for her decisions; albeit decisions that must 
be weighed against her ethical duty to the vulnerable single Other especially when she 
appears in the guise of the refugee.  To that end alterity offers a means of challenging 
incessantly and with rigorous insistence that the law has a duty towards the Other that 
exceeds the minimum accorded by rights and in conscience impels the law to recognise that 
anything less than the maximum is in some measure an ethical betrayal even though that 
betrayal may be all too frequently unavoidable.  In contrast to materialist analyses it is only a 
transcendental rendering of ethics that makes such an insight possible. 
 
                                                          
44 Supra n. 1 at pp 174- 5. 
45 Supra n.1 at 240. 
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